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In the transactions of the Grotius Society (Vol. IX. p. 119,
London 1920) the present writer developed the thesis that there
is no existing state which has succeeded to the general rights and
liabilities of the defunct Austrian and Russian Empires, and
that it is only puerile to consider the Austrian Republic and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as "Austria" and "Russia",
on account of the name of the former or the size of the latter.
A state does not lose its identity because of a change of
government; it does not lose its identity because of a loss of ter-
ritory. But if the government functioning in a given area dis-
appears, and is succeeded by no one government, but new gov-
ernments arise and maintain themselves in various portions
of the original area, then it is equally clear that the State, as
such, ceases to exist, and that several new States have arisen on
its ruins. Were it otherwise, Italy, as the heir of the Roman
Empire, would have a good title to the continent of Europe. A
state is an idea: the government which embodies it may change,
but if it ceases to cohere, the idea becomes senseless, and the
State ceases to exist.
The new States are no more bound by the obligations of their
predecessor (further than treaties and perhaps purely local ob-
ligations may extend), than an incoming tenant is bound by
the- obligations of his predecessor who has been evicted, or a
son by the obligations of his parent. A government's power to
burden its people should not extend to bind those of them who
break away from it, and found a fresh political society. The
delusive analogy of private law succession on death has exercised
far too persuasive an authority on many Continental European
jurists in this matter. But at least it is wrong to count Rivier
among their number (as Mr. Sayre does, in the learned article
written by him in the American Journal of International Law
for 19181). For Rivier only says that the obligations of the ex-
tinguished state to private persons continue to attach to the
states which have newly arisen in its place. This may be right
or wrong and seems highly illogical; but the point is that Rivier
quite admits that obligations of a public kind, personal to the
extinct state, are extinguished. One can no more complain of
this than one can complain of a debtor's dying or going bank-
rupt, or of a corporation's going into liquidation. The obligee has
I Change of Sovereignty and Private Ownership of Land (1918) 12 Am.
JOUR. INT. LAW, 475, note 1.
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simply ceased to exist as a source of profit-and that is all there
is to it.
I understand Dr. Berriedale Keith (State Succcssion) and the
Italian jurists to take the same view, while Kent and Phillimore
are quoted as thinking that the obligations persist. Grotius
and Story, whose authority is cited by Phillimore in support of
the latter opinion, only speak of the property of the succeeding
states, and are not referring at all to their obligations. Vattel
says that a State's obligations by Metz become void if it cease3
to exist as an independent political society-from any cause
whatever. And besides the injustice of holding new political so-
cieties to the engagements of those very states from which they
have revolted, there arises the important practical difficulty of
ascertaining how the obligations are to be apportioned. By rev-
enue-? by riches? by population? by area? avoiding the spe-
cial benefits derived from the original obligation?-or law? It
is impossible to arrive at any just solution.
Mr. Sibley in The Story of thc Man2illa Ransoji, which ap-
pears at p. 17 of the Journal of the Society of Comparative
Legislative and International Law for February, 1925, a schol-
arly and able essay, states the opinion that the scheme of the
Treaty of St. Germain and the Treaty of Trianon, dividing the
debt of the Austrian Empire among the States (including Italy
and Servia) which obtained its territory, established the prin-
ciple of the succession of states to the obligations of their pred-
ecessor as law. But it cannot too often be repeated that treaties
are not normally made in order to secure one's rights, but to
secure advantages which would not exist without them. The
stipulations of a treaty are rather evidence that the object of
the stipulation is not a right than evidence that it is. Mr. Sibley
thinks that the group of Versailles Treaties "will presumably
assert the security of the liberties of Europe longer even than
the letz of Utrecht." Perhaps the Bletz of Utrecht did not
really avail for so very long; and it may be surmised that few
publicists share Mr. Sibley's cordial confidence in the Treaties
of Versailles, St. Germain, Neuilly, Trianon and Lausanne. It
seems to be going a good deal too far to say that because the
Versailles politicans found it convenient to maintain the claims
of their bond-holders on the revenues of their late allies and real
or nominal enemies, the Bohemians and the Tyrolese, the Tran-
sylvanians, Italians, Servians and Magyars, therefore a great
general principle of law was established, confirming the principle
that if a State disappears, the States which get its territory must
pay its debts. The Allies made their friends and proteges pay;
that was only natural but it was not necessarily juridical.
2 This standard was adopted by the Treaty of St. Germain. But it obvi-
ously is unduly favorable to a rich and lightly-taxed territory.
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It need scarely be added that apart from the special matter
of the funded debt and the secured debts of the old Empire (as
to which, as Dr. Sibley pertinently points out, the matter of
succession to the obligations is concluded by the Treaties), the
general question of the continuance and incidence of obligations
remains unaffected by what was done at the Versailles Confer-
ence. And in particular the continuance and incidence of ob-
ligations specifically affecting particular land in the territory of
the exploded state, may well be decided differently from that of
its other obligations. Money borrowed specifically for harbor
works in Fiume might possibly have to be repaid by the state in
which Fiume might some day lie. Also, the obligations of a State
which splits up by agreement may well persist when those of
a violently disrupted State would not; in such a case they would
probably be joint and several. But it is submitted with confi-
dence that the particular arrangements of the Versailles group
of treaties are of no consequence in determining the true rule
to be applied to its obligations when a state dissolves. The cir-
cumstances were too highly special; and the decision was not
assumed as a ,matter of law but stipulated as a matter of con-
tract. In our view-as in Rivier's, Keith's and Vattel's-the ob-
ligation of a state is the obligation of an ideal person. The ob-
ligees take the risk of the disappearance of that ideal person, as
the private law obligee takes the risk of the disappearance of
a real person. They have lent their credit or performed their
services and supplied their goods for the purposes of a State
which has vanished. Why should they call upon the people who
have repudiated the whole system for reimbursement? It is
surely enough, to allow a government to rivet its responsibility
upon its successors in the State, without placing in its hands
the power to bind revolted States! Clearly, it could not bind
one revolted state, were it as big as Brazil when it broke loose
from Portugal. Why then should it be able to bind five or six
simultaneously revolted States?
. Mr. Sibley argues, on the basis of the general rule of Succes-
sion 3 supposed to be established by the Versailles group of Trea-
ties, that the United States, having taken over the Philippine
Islands, is liable to Great Britain for the money which Spain
promised to pay to Great Britain upon the capitulation of Manilla
in 1761. He says-as is perhaps true-that there is no prescrip-
tion which runs against such a claim; but he forgets that war
has more than once interposed between Spain and Great Britain
in the interim, and that it has been again and again declared
that war puts an end to all cnventional stipulations between
the parties. It would be surprising if this capitulation has been
1 Not only to extinct states, but to ceding states as well.
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restored to effect by Treaties of Peace on each occasion. Mr.
Sibley thinks that the United States might have to refund on
this head to Great Britain £2,187,000,000 (over $10,000,000,000)
as a maximum, assuming compound interest to be allowed. This
is, of course, pour rire. But, putting the case on its most modest
footing, it is a pretty complete reductio ad abs.rdum of the
"succession" theory, that the United States should be called upon
to pay Great Britain for ransoming Spanish Manilla!
